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On the Importance to Economic Success  
of Property Rights in Finance and Innovation  
 
Stephen H. Haber 
F. Scott Kieff 
Troy A. Paredes∗ 
Abstract 
This Essay surveys recent developments across the fields of 
finance and innovation to highlight some common themes 
concerning the importance of property rights to economic 
success. Society regularly makes choices when shaping the 
precise contours of the legal institutions that govern the 
behavior of market actors, often in response to high profile 
issues like the collapse of Enron and the patenting of life-
saving AIDS drugs. Recognizing that no set of legal institutions 
or related enforcement mechanisms will be perfect, this Essay 
explores some particularly helpful institutional features based 
on property rights that too often are overlooked by policy 
makers and commentators, even though these property-based 
institutional features have long been associated with economic 
success in a number of diverse settings.  
 
 ∗ Stephen H. Haber is the A.A. and Jeanne Welch Milligan Professor in the Stanford 
University School of Humanities and Sciences and Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at 
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. F. Scott Kieff is a Professor of Law at Washington 
University in St. Louis and Research Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. Troy 
A. Paredes is a Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis. They have initiated the 
Hoover Project on Commercializing Innovation to study the law, economics, and politics of 
commercializing innovation. Comments are welcome at fskieff.91@alum.mit.edu.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this Essay, we offer various observations to illustrate the 
importance of property rights, highlighting as examples certain key 
institutional mechanisms that have spurred economic success in the 
United States. We think that debates over property rights too often 
are focused on questions of how many property rights would be best, 
generally with owners demanding more property rights and users 
demanding fewer, or on the number of government approvals 
required for a private party to engage in some enterprise. While these 
are important considerations, we urge that attention instead be 
focused on the different question of how these entitlements are 
structured. Rather than endeavor to develop a formal definition or 
theory of property, we presume that property rights, like most things, 
have “good” and “bad” features; and we endeavor to highlight the 
ways in which a particular entitlement can be structured to employ 
the “best” features of property rights while avoiding their “worst” 
features.  
For purposes of this Essay, we conceptualize a property right as 
an interest that is easy to predict and find; easy to bundle and divide; 
structured so that those concerned with the subject matter that the 
right protects can and should deal directly with the private owner 
holding the right; and not readily reconfigured by a judge or other 
government decision-maker. When property rights are structured this 
way, they are easier for market actors to use (i.e., transact over). It is 
in this way that property rights promote economic growth, 
competition, and jobs. When property rights have these attributes, we 
think of them as being “at their best.”  
When property rights are “at their worst,” they have fixed owners 
who are not freely able to contract over them. Furthermore, property 
rights are “at their worst” when their contours can be changed either 
only at the discretion of government actors or too easily at the 
discretion of government actors, which puts those interested in the 
subject matter the rights protect in the position of needing to deal 
with the relevant government decision-makers. When property rights 
are structured this way, they are easier for government actors to 
abuse. The government actors we envision include not only 
government legislators, regulators, and judges who make and enforce 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/10
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the legal rules, but also powerful political constituents who influence 
these government actors. The effect of structuring property rights in 
this way too often is to concentrate wealth and power and 
compromise private sector transacting. We would view legal 
institutions like these more as regulatory entitlements than private 
property.  
To be sure, most real-world legal institutions are located 
somewhere on a continuum between the two stylized poles 
summarized above, combining elements from each. For purposes of 
the discussions that follow, the more a particular legal institution 
resembles property “at its best,” the more we would call that 
institution “property” or “property-like.”  
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
To illustrate the link between property rights and economic 
success, we begin below with two different comparative examples of 
legal system pairs, with one system in each pair essentially lacking 
important property rights. The first pair compares the banking system 
of the United States with that of Mexico; and the second compares 
the biotechnology innovation system of the United States with those 
of Europe and Japan. We then use the example of venture capital to 
highlight a particular economic success story in the United States at 
the interface between finance and innovation. 
A. Comparing Banking Systems in the United States and Mexico  
The United States is a particularly wealthy country. Figure 1 
shows a common measure of national wealth, gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita. On this measure, the United States is one of the 
richest countries in the world. In fact, the only countries that show up 
as slightly richer than the United States by this measure are countries 
which have vast natural resources but a very small population, such 
as Qatar.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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FIGURE 1 
 
As with any complex system, the cause of this success is based on 
many factors. We think that one important factor is the impact of 
property rights. When we discuss property rights, we are not only 
talking about rights in physical assets like homes and land. We are 
also talking about property rights in intangibles—the types of 
interests that are key to finance and innovation—which are of 
particular relevance to the modern economy.1  
 
 1. Cf. Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why 
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2004) 
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We are not focusing on making the rich richer. We think that 
property rights in intangible assets help make everyone richer, 
including the developing world, by stimulating economic 
opportunity.2  
One area of the U.S. economy that depends heavily on property 
rights is the financial system. The U.S. financial system is especially 
large, as illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the sizes of various 
countries’ national financial systems compared to their GDP. The 
only countries with higher ratios of financial system size to GDP are 
those whose entire economy is based on finance, such as Hong Kong, 
which is basically a city with a capital market.  
FIGURE 2 
 
 
(considering shareholder property rights).  
 2. Cf  HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000). 
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The role of property rights in strengthening a national financial 
system can be seen by comparing the current Mexican banking 
system with the one in the United States. Banking systems rely on 
various forms of property rights, including the types of property 
rights that convey ownership in tangible things like land, as well 
those in more intangible things that enable stable business 
relationships, such as freedom to strike diverse contracts that will be 
reliably enforced, which is bolstered by predictable regulatory 
environments. For example, bank depositors want property rights in 
their deposits so that they can be assured that they can get back the 
money they deposit. Banks want property rights in the contingent 
interests in collateral that they take when loaning money, such as 
through home mortgages or other security interests, so they can be 
assured that they can get back the money they loan. Banks also want 
any executed guarantees to be enforceable. Borrowers, on the other 
hand, need to be confident that lenders will fulfill their obligations to 
extend credit in accordance with the terms of the loan documents. A 
bank’s other constituencies, such as any minority shareholders and 
various stakeholders, want property rights in the investments they 
make so that they can be assured that insiders, such as controlling 
shareholders and managers, will not run off with the investments or 
otherwise expropriate value for themselves. Banks want reliable 
banking and currency regulations, as well as a credible central bank, 
so that they know they will be able to continue to operate.  
Although a high degree of property-rights treatment in each of 
these respects is present in the United States, it is largely lacking 
from the Mexican banking system. One salient consequence is that 
the home mortgage market in Mexico is so small as to almost be 
nonexistent. Across the entire country of Mexico, only about 18,000 
home mortgages were originated on sales of existing homes in 2004, 
which is about as many as originate each year in the small suburban 
area surrounding Stanford University.3 Not only does an anemic 
home mortgage market deprive a national financial system of an 
important source of capital and target for investment, but it also bites 
 
 3. Stephen Haber, Why Banks Don’t Lend: The Mexican Financial System 26 (Feb. 22, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
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particularly hard against those individuals who lack access to the 
large quantities of cash it typically takes to buy a home.4  
B. Comparing Biotechnology Innovation Systems in the United 
States, Europe, and Japan 
Property rights also are important for national innovation systems. 
The U.S. intellectual property (IP) system is huge. By some accounts, 
IP-based companies are the largest sector of the U.S. economy and 
account for about $5 trillion of U.S. GDP, which represents about 
half of U.S. GDP and makes the IP component of the U.S. economy 
larger than the entire GDP of any other nation. 5  
The mechanisms by which property rights in IP advance economic 
growth are often misunderstood, leading many to suggest that IP 
rights, such as patents, could easily be replaced by direct payments 
like tax credits or cash rewards.6 It is undoubtedly true that the 
possibility of a financial payoff incentivizes people to engage in 
inventive activity. Other considerations, however, also spur 
invention. Necessity, after all, often is the mother of invention, as are 
many other factors like an individual’s job as an academic, 
government, or corporate researcher. Indeed, IP itself may not be as 
powerful of an incentive to invent as many believe, given that the 
financial payoff may not come until after years of multi-million 
dollar litigation, if at all.  
In any case, the emphasis on direct incentives for inventive 
individuals is misplaced, overlooking that the central role of patents 
backed up by property rights is other than getting inventions made. 
Patents play two other roles more effectively, and for these roles, 
patent substitutes, like cash rewards handed out by the government, 
are particularly poor stand-ins. First, patents get inventions put to use. 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Robert J. Shapiro & Kevin A. Hassett, The Economic Value of Intellectual Property 3 
(Oct. 2005), http://www.usaforinnovation.org/news/ip_master.pdf. See also John Dudas, 
Director, U.S. Patent Office Director Address at Chapman University School of Law (Apr. 19, 
2007). 
 6. See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual 
Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 535 (2001). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 215 Haber Kieff Paredes book pages.doc 7/29/2008 10:33:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
222 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 26:215 
 
 
Second, patents are powerful antimonopoly weapons—the vital 
slingshots “Davids” use to take on “Goliaths.”7  
When patents are enforced with clear and robust rules, and backed 
up by a strong right to exclude, they serve an essential role in the 
complex process of getting inventions commercialized. Patents help 
get inventions put to use broadly and rapidly and help new businesses 
enter and compete against established players. Bringing an invention 
to market requires coordination among many complementary users of 
that technology, including capitalists, developers, managers, laborers, 
other technologists, manufacturers, marketers, and distributors.  
Patents help this diverse group act in a coordinated fashion in at 
least two distinct ways. First, the right to exclude associated with a 
published patent acts like a light in a dark room, drawing to itself 
those interested in the patented subject matter. This beacon effect 
gets these diverse parties to interact with each other and with the 
patentee. Second, the expectation that the patent can be enforced is 
what provides these parties with the required incentive to strike deals 
with each other. This bargain effect falls apart if the parties know the 
patent cannot be enforced. 
The profit potential associated with an enforceable patent gives 
everyone an incentive in the commercialization process. For example, 
the promise of financial payoffs is what brings in the essential capital 
investments to start and sustain businesses. But because many of 
these deals hinge on complex contractual promises over unique 
assets, even the promise of money from a damages award in the event 
of either breach or infringement is not enough to consummate deals, 
which is why the credible threat of an injunction can be so important.  
The field of modern biotechnology provides a particularly stark 
example of the role played by property rights in the form of patents. 
The landmark Chakrabarty decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1980 resolved what some thought was an open question when it 
confirmed the availability of patents in basic biotechnology.8 The rest 
 
 7. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An 
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 
327 (2006).  
 8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–18 (1980) (holding that living organisms 
are not per se unpatentable).  
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of the world made the opposite decision, and still has various legal 
and regulatory regimes that block effective patent protection for 
biotechnology. As a result, only in the United States, and only since 
1980, have patents been available in modern biotechnology.  
The United States, Europe, and Japan each had large 
biotechnology companies, often collectively called “Big Pharma,” 
before 1980, and have continued to have large biotechnology 
companies since then. Throughout this time period, companies in all 
three regions have had access to comparable technological and 
capital resources. But what has distinguished the United States is that 
only the United States added patents to the mix in 1980. Notably, 
only in the U.S., and again only since 1980, has the biotechnology 
industry also included a steady pool of roughly 1400 small- and 
medium-sized companies that is consistently turning over.9 Although 
we recognize that numerous factors impact the growth of any 
industry, a natural reading of this data suggests that adding patents 
helped spur the U.S. biotechnology industry to be the most vibrant 
and competitive in the world, as measured by the number of 
competitors doing business in the area and the number of new 
products brought to market. The unique growth in the U.S. 
biotechnology industry has directly benefited both the basic 
biological research community, by providing expanded resources like 
funding, and the general public, by providing better goods and 
services in important industries like healthcare.10  
 
 9. NIH: Moving Research from the Bench to the Bedside: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 47 (2003), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/action/108-38.pdf (statement of Phyllis Gardner, Senior 
Associate Dean for Education and Student Affairs, Stanford University) (detailing the 
differences between the biotechnology industry and the pharmaceutical industry). Although 
inventorship and ownership for U.S. patents are open to those outside the U.S., a variety of 
practical reasons—such as the general “sticky” nature of local practices, as well as what is 
generally known as “home bias” or “domestic bias”—explain why those who are outside the 
U.S. are less likely than those within the U.S. to have sought U.S. patents in fields that are 
closed to patenting within most other nations of the world.  
 10. Iain Cockburn et al., Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, in U.S. INDUSTRY IN 2000: 
STUDIES IN COMPETITIVE PERFORMANCE 389–92 (David C. Mowery ed., 1999) (reviewing 
relative performance of the U.S. biotechnology industry). 
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C. Venture Capital: An Interface Between Finance and Innovation  
Property rights also are important for a key interface between 
finance and innovation—namely, venture capital. The U.S. venture 
capital system is particularly large compared with that in other 
countries. Figure 3 shows the sizes of various countries’ national 
venture capital systems compared to their GDP. As in earlier figures, 
the United States is on the far side of the scale, leading the way with 
only one country, this time Israel, ahead of it.  
FIGURE 3 
(Source: OECD Venture Capital Database) 
Venture capital interacts in several ways with both the rest of 
finance and IP. Venture capital helps finance and IP by helping 
investors and inventors. Venture capital gives financial capital a new 
target for investment, just as it gives IP a new source of investment. 
Venture capital also depends upon property rights in finance and IP. 
Property rights in finance and IP help investors and inventors exploit 
these assets and unleash value. In short, the freedom to divide and 
bundle these assets helps get them put to use as circumstances and 
needs change. By structuring venture capital deals carefully, as 
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property-based approaches to contract law and corporate law allow, 
those investing financial and human capital in risky ventures are able 
to protect themselves from their teammates. Similarly, a property-
based approach to IP helps parties protect themselves from 
competitors.  
The net impact of venture capital appears impressive. By some 
accounts, it generated over 17% of U.S. GDP, while investment in 
venture capital was only about .2% of GDP, yielding a fantastic 
direct return on investment.11 The indirect returns appeared even 
more impressive. Venture capital also creates jobs, by some accounts 
having employed 9% of the private sector work force, and generates 
tax receipts, having contributed total sales of $2.1 trillion in 2005.12  
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CHALLENGES 
In several high profile areas of both finance and IP, the law is 
being shaped in ways that make it work less like property rights, or 
less like property rights “at their best.” The overall net impact of 
these changes is a topic of legitimate debate. The narrower goal of 
this Essay is to highlight some important elements within a few areas 
of contemporary policy debates to show how several popular reforms 
might be expected to have negative effects because of their common 
approach in shifting relevant legal institutions to be less like property 
or, in other words, to resemble property rights “at their worst.”  
A. Finance: SOX and the SEC’s Regulation of Hedge Funds 
Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)13 and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) recent effort to regulate hedge 
funds imposed mandatory rules intended to protect investors, leaving 
relevant market actors less freedom to negotiate with each other over 
which investor protections they actually preferred. A central problem 
with such mandatory approaches (as compared with default 
approaches that allow participants to opt in, opt out, or contract 
 
 11. NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 5 (2007).  
 12. Id.  
 13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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around) is that they can prove too costly given their benefits, 
interfering with economic success. Additionally, burdensome 
mandates can end up uniquely disadvantaging smaller startups as 
compared to their larger, more-established competitors. Smaller 
enterprises often have a particularly hard time complying with one-
size-fits-all legal requirements.  
Passed in response to the debacles at Enron and WorldCom, SOX 
is the most far-reaching corporate governance and securities 
legislation enacted since Congress adopted the original federal 
securities laws. SOX meaningfully increased the role of government 
mandates and decreased the role of private ordering, as government 
mandates displaced market discipline as a tool for cabining behavior. 
When SOX was adopted, criticism was mostly muted. Many 
believed that Congress had to react to the wave of corporate scandals 
that began with Enron. Further, it was politically unpopular to 
criticize stronger regulation as U.S. stock markets tumbled, new 
scandals broke, and people lost their jobs. Not surprisingly given the 
political atmosphere at the time, SOX was adopted 99–0 in the Senate 
and 423–3 in the House.14  
Those who were skeptical stressed a variety of concerns.15 For 
example, critics of SOX claimed that the overwhelming 
congressional support for SOX reflected a rush to judgment and 
politicking by elected officials to appease voters. Critics also stressed 
that the costs of the heavy-handed government crackdown that SOX 
represented would offset the benefits. In short, critics of SOX warned 
that more vigorous regulation and enforcement would be expensive 
as managers became more risk-averse in how they ran their 
enterprises and as senior executives and boards became distracted 
 
 14. Richard B. Schmitt et al., Corporate-Oversight Bill Passes, Eases Path for Investor 
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at A1. 
 15. See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts 
on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495 
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). For the views of others, see HENRY N. 
BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; 
HOW TO FIX IT (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director 
Independence Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. 
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 1 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
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from running their businesses in having to focus more time and 
attention on legal compliance. In addition, SOX critics recognized 
that the out-of-pocket costs of compliance could be considerable, 
particularly for smaller companies.  
Unfortunately, the need for swift action seemed to have 
outweighed the need for in depth cost-benefit analysis in the push to 
go after corporate malfeasance in the post-Enron climate; recent 
experience has, to a notable degree, borne out the worries concerning 
the costs of SOX.16 Consider two well-known examples. First, 
section 404 of SOX, which imposes new internal control 
requirements on public companies, has turned out to be much more 
costly than initially projected. Regulatory efforts have since been 
made to scale back section 404, particularly for small public 
companies. Second, U.S. markets are losing listings to foreign 
markets. Today, issuers can travel the globe in search of financial 
capital. As U.S. regulatory requirements become more burdensome, 
issuers can simply raise capital elsewhere or remain private. Indeed, 
companies that already are public may choose to go private to avoid 
 
 16. See Alan Murray, Panel’s Mission: Easing Capital-Market Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
12, 2006, at A2 (“A new commission, ‘The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation,’ will be 
unveiled today. Chaired by former White House economic adviser Glenn Hubbard and former 
Goldman Sachs President John Thornton, the group plans to recommend changes to the 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other laws and regulations that they conclude hinder the 
competitiveness of U.S. capital markets.”). The private-sector Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation, with support of U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, issued a report in 
November 2006 addressing the concern that U.S. capital markets are losing their competitive 
edge, in part because of a much more burdensome legal environment in the aftermath of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and more aggressive government enforcement. COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL 
MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS 
REGULATION (2006), http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_Report REV2.pdf. 
 Shortly after the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation issued its 2006 report, New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (NY) issued a similar 
report on the need to sustain the financial leadership of New York and the United States. See, 
e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Moving the Market: Identity Crisis for New York?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 
2007, at C3. The report responds to concerns that U.S. financial firms are being adversely 
impacted as U.S. capital markets become relatively less attractive as compared to foreign 
markets because of, among other factors, a more demanding U.S. regulatory and enforcement 
environment in the aftermath of Enron’s collapse and SOX. To the extent that U.S. capital 
markets lose some of their competitive edge, it uniquely impacts New York at the center of the 
U.S. financial system.  
 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also weighed in with a report in early 2007 on U.S. 
competitiveness in global financial markets. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Panel Urges Steps to 
Boost Allure of U.S. Markets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2007, at A1. 
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the regulatory burdens of being a public company. A number of 
studies suggest just this has been happening post-SOX.17 Those 
companies going public are increasingly turning to overseas stock 
markets instead of listing in the United States. 
As the SOX experience illustrates, any assessment of financial 
regulation should start with a basic cost-benefit analysis. Ideally, the 
cost-benefit analysis will not focus just on the costs and benefits of a 
particular proposal, but will compare costs and benefits of all 
available options, including those presently in use. That is, a properly 
robust cost-benefit analysis assesses different approaches to a 
supposed problem in comparison to one another, without presuming 
that existing approaches are best. Such a comparative institutional 
analysis post-Enron should have highlighted that a desire for greater 
corporate accountability does not necessarily warrant more mandates 
and stiffer sanctions.  
Indeed, the urge for more corporate accountability in Enron’s 
aftermath should only have started the discussion. If more 
accountability in fact was needed, it did not follow that more legal 
mandates or more aggressive government enforcement was the 
answer. While a government crackdown is an option, it is not 
necessarily the best option in every circumstance. Take market 
discipline, for example, as an alternative to more laws on the books 
and more litigation. Once certain corporate misconduct is brought to 
light, investors, analysts, and other securities market participants, 
along with the so-called gatekeepers (attorneys, investment bankers, 
accountants, and credit rating agencies), are better informed and 
better equipped to ask tough questions and to scrub a company’s SEC 
 
 17. For examples of relevant studies, see William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public 
After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” Emory Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 
05-4 (Feb. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=672761; Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes, 
& Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going Private Decisions (May 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=546626; Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the US, Univ. of Texas Law & Econ. Research Paper 
No. 55 (Dec. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=876624; Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-
Mandic, & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-
Country Analysis, USC Center in Law, Econ., & Org. Research Paper No. C06-5 & USC Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 06-10 (Apr. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769. 
 Companies might choose to avoid U.S. public stock markets for several financial and 
business reasons, but it cannot be gainsaid that a factor in the decision to list overseas or go or 
remain private is the heavier regulatory burden a U.S. public company must now shoulder. 
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filings more carefully. The market itself can demand corporate 
governance reforms and more corporate transparency without new 
legal mandates. One such example is the present push for majority 
voting for boards of directors that has gained steam recently, even as 
the SEC did not adopt its proposal to allow shareholders limited 
access to the corporate ballot for nominating directors. Shareholders, 
led by institutional investors and increasingly by hedge funds, have 
been much more active in recent years.  
The potential benefits of market-based responses over government 
mandates are straightforward: markets are more flexible than 
regulation, and market-based responses can be more narrowly 
tailored than regulation to meet the needs of a particular company, 
which may change over time. In short, market-based approaches are 
not one-size-fits-all and are not mandatory. Further, if a company 
changes its corporate governance system under market pressure, it 
can always unwind the decision if it turns out to be unwise. This 
give-and-take allows a more efficient set of governance techniques to 
evolve over time across companies. Some argue that market reforms 
are too short-lived and that good corporate governance will go by the 
wayside during the next bull market. These are legitimate concerns. 
But on the other hand, regulation often overstays its welcome. This is 
a particular concern in the case of SOX, aspects of which were 
hastily adopted in a politically-charged atmosphere. 
Although not as high profile as SOX, another recent instance of 
reform that more closely resembles property rights in finance “at their 
worst” comes from the recent effort of the SEC to regulate hedge 
funds. In 2004, the SEC adopted a new rule18 requiring hedge fund 
managers to register as investment advisers under the federal 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.19 While requiring hedge fund 
managers to register with the SEC gave some protection to hedge 
fund investors from fraud and other abusive practices,20 the rule was 
 
 18. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Inv. Adv. Act 
Release No. 2333 (Dec. 2, 2004).   
 19. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (2000).  
 20. It is not clear that the institutional investors and wealthy individuals who invest in 
hedge funds need the SEC’s protection. See generally Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to 
Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 975, 990–98.  
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also costly. Registration under the federal Investment Advisers Act 
would subject hedge funds to a host of costly requirements and 
subject a manager and its fund to SEC examination and inspection.  
Accordingly, critics of the rule argued that it would drive hedge funds 
offshore and chill hedge fund managers from undertaking at least 
some new and innovative investment strategies, leading to less 
efficient, less liquid, and less stable financial markets.  
The SEC hedge fund rule did allow some room for private 
ordering but of a distorting variety. Hedge fund managers could opt 
out of the investment adviser registration requirement if the fund’s 
investors were “locked up” (i.e., could not withdraw their capital 
from the fund) for at least two years. Ostensibly, the purpose of the 
lock-up period was to distinguish hedge funds, on the one hand, from 
private equity and venture capital funds, on the other. The two-year 
lock-up provision gave rise to three related predictions: first, hedge 
funds would try to use longer lock-up periods; second, it would be 
difficult for smaller and newer hedge funds whose managers are less 
well-known to convince investors to lock up their money for longer 
periods, because the threat of capital withdrawals is an important 
means by which investors hold their managers accountable; and third, 
the cost and burden of compliance with the federal Investment 
Advisers Act would be too great for some smaller funds to bear. 
Thus, the SEC’s hedge fund rule appeared to erect an entry barrier 
that undercut competition in the hedge fund industry by giving 
established firms an advantage over upstarts. Accordingly, 
established firms might have welcomed the SEC’s foray into hedge 
fund regulation. Not only did the regulation, as suggested, seem to 
undercut competition for capital, but a two-year lock-up period would 
compromise the disciplining effect of threatened capital withdrawals. 
Not long after it went into effect, the SEC’s rule requiring hedge fund 
manager registration was overturned on other grounds by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the Goldstein decision.21 
In sum, a defining characteristic of property rights “at their best” 
is that they accommodate private ordering, allowing parties to order 
their affairs as they see fit. Yet SOX is, and the SEC’s hedge fund 
 
 21. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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rule was, mandatory in nature. With only a few exceptions, no room 
was allowed for parties to opt out or otherwise contract around either 
set of reforms without going offshore. Not only do such mandatory 
approaches to regulation often impose high costs on the market, 
thereby impeding economic success, but they also often hit market 
entrants harder than large established players, thereby undercutting 
competition.  
B. Intellectual Property: Commercialization and the Right to Exclude  
The difference between property rights “at their best” and 
property rights “at their worst” also can be seen in the context of 
three contemporary areas of debate about intellectual property. The 
first is the call for patent reform that in essence would give 
government actors more discretion to reject or revoke patents. The 
second is the call for greater antitrust scrutiny of IP cases and deals. 
The third is the greater avoidance of IP rights in the name of 
increasing economic development and human health, especially in 
developing countries. Regrettably, an element common to each of 
these reform efforts is that they shift the applicable legal rules to 
make IP more like property “at its worst.”  
1. Patent Reform and Government Discretion 
The first example of the erosion of the property-like treatment of 
IP comes from the set of so-called patent reforms presently pushed in 
Congress. After multiple hearings22 in early 2007 concerning a joint 
House and Senate bill sponsored by Democrats and Republicans 
alike,23 the House voted to adopt a version of the legislation in 
 
 22. See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing Before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1908, The Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); The Importance of the Patent Reform on Small Business: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 23. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, introduced as a bicameral and bipartisan bill under the 
titles H.R. 1908 and S. 1145 on April 18, 2007, by, inter alia, Sens. Leahy (D) and Hatch (R), 
as well as Reps. Berman (D) and Smith (R).  
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September 2007;24 and throughout the first part of 2008 it kept 
appearing as though the Senate may have been poised to act as well. 
The crux of the changes urged in Congress is to make it more 
difficult to obtain or keep a patent by granting a government 
administrator or judge greater discretion to determine whether a 
patent should issue or remain in force. Lining up in very vocal 
support of the legislation have been some notable big companies in 
favor of this added flexibility because they say they are more likely to 
be ensnared in a thicket of patent cases.25  
These efforts to change the patent system seem to forget 
flexibility’s Achilles Heel, and that what is good for some big 
businesses is not always good for business overall. In short, by 
affording government bureaucrats and judges more discretion, 
flexibility increases uncertainty, undercuts predictability, and gives a 
built-in advantage to large companies with hefty lobbying and 
litigation budgets. That may be one reason why some big firms want 
the change.  
Many of the specific changes to the patent system that have been 
proposed are similar in effect, although they go by various names, 
such as enhanced examination, opposition, re-examination, and 
second-window review. These proposed changes are like the recent 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the KSR case, which many see as 
having raised the bar for the obviousness standard by injecting more 
discretion into the obviousness determination, a central issue for most 
patent cases.26 The stated goal of the proposed legislative changes, as 
well as the stated goal of those urging the Court to act in KSR, is to 
make it easier for government decision makers to reject patents, 
usually on the basis of what is known as prior art—that is, whether 
the claimed invention had been previously known or used (novelty) 
or was just about to be (obviousness).  
Under today’s patent law, determinations about the prior art are 
largely questions of fact, based on evidence like documents and 
factual testimony, as opposed to opinion testimony. Most patent 
 
 24. H.R. 1908 passed 220–175 on September 7, 2007.  
 25. See, e.g., Bruce Sewell, Patent Nonsense, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at A15 (opinion 
piece by Intel’s general counsel).  
 26. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).  
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litigators well remember the famous cases of the single student theses 
catalogued and shelved in the libraries at Frieburg University in 
Germany or Reed College in Portland, Oregon, reinforcing how 
factual proof is required to show not just what such documents 
contain, but also when they were both physically available to the 
public and logically available to an interested searcher through some 
meaningful indexing system like a subject matter catalog.27  
The central issue presented in the KSR case is whether expert 
opinion testimony in court, when adopted at the discretion of a 
federal judge, is enough to prove what would have been obvious to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art of the patentee at the time in 
history when the patentee made an invention. Those who asked the 
Court to act in KSR see that case as standing for the proposition that 
government decision makers, such as judges, now have increased 
discretion to pronounce what the prior art teaches; and they applaud 
that result, hoping to see it applied generously in court and during 
initial Patent Office examinations. For example, based on this reading 
of the case, a patent examiner now would be able to block patents on 
the basis of the examiner’s own assertions about what the state of the 
art was at a particular time in history, without having to rely on the 
same amount of factual proof that has long been required, such as the 
teachings from specific documents and sample products. Others read 
the KSR decision more narrowly, arguing that the case was narrowly 
decided on its facts. In this view, the relevant inquiry remains an 
objective determination of precisely what was taught by the particular 
combination of relevant pieces of prior art.28  
The debate over the actual legal impact of the Supreme Court’s 
KSR decision may be moot if the proposed statutory changes are 
 
 27. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (counting a single catalogued 
student thesis at Frieburg University in Germany as prior art because it was, inter alia, 
physically available to the public); In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (not 
counting three student theses at an American university as prior art, even though they were 
physically accessible to the public, because there was no evidence that they were logically 
accessible to the interested public by, for example, being indexed in the library’s subject 
catalog). 
 28. For more on KSR and the problems of flexibility, see Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott 
Kieff, Flexible Patent Law . . . and Its Achilles Heel, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2007, at A19 (Letter 
to the Editor); Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott Kieff, & Troy A. Paredes, Patent Reform Legislation: 
No Final Cut for Examiners, NAT’L L.J., May 14, 2007, at 22.  
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adopted in Congress, as those changes would implement the same 
type of flexible approach that a broad reading of KSR is said to usher 
in. Even if the statutory regime does not change, judges and patent 
examiners in the Patent Office will have at least some additional 
flexibility while lower courts hash out the proper interpretation of 
KSR.  
As a result, it is important to consider more fully the wisdom of 
affording judges and Patent Office examiners more discretion in 
deciding a patent’s validity and subsequent enforceability. 
Regrettably, the call for more discretion relies on two false premises 
about how the patent system actually works.  
The first false premise is that beefing up the patent examiner’s 
resources would meaningfully help her find the key prior art. Of 
course, our examining corps should have good access to Internet 
databases and ample time and training to peruse them. But no 
realistically available amount of time and training will help an 
examiner at her desk obtain the laboratory notebook of an individual 
researcher at some company or university or an obscure student thesis 
on the bookshelf of a foreign library, which are the types of places 
where the key prior art often is found.  
The second false premise is that decisions in court or in an agency 
like the Patent Office that are made on the basis of discretion, rather 
than facts, can be immune from political and other pressure. Giving 
courts and examiners a pass from having to get and explicitly rely on 
hard evidence concerning the prior art does not come without a 
serious cost. Asking a decision maker to use her legal or technical 
expertise to inform what she thinks the state of the art was at a 
particular time in history gives her greater discretion than asking an 
ordinary jury whether a particular document or sample product 
existed at a particular time and what that document actually contains. 
Even ordinary lay juries can be particularly adept at making such 
factual determinations, which is a central reason we have a 
constitutional right to jury trials in every criminal case and in civil 
cases involving a legal remedy, such as damages (as opposed to only 
an equitable remedy, such as an injunction).29 Because large firms 
 
 29. See F. Scott Kieff, How Ordinary Judges and Juries Decide the Seemingly Complex 
Technological Questions of Patentability over the Prior Art, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES 
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have fatter lobbying and litigation budgets than smaller innovators, 
such discretion risks converting the patent system into a tool for 
suppressing competition by making it too easy for big firms to tie up 
or invalidate any patent owned by a small innovator.  
The pernicious impact of such discretion is not a mere possibility, 
but has become a reality in the recent history of the patent system. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the lobbying and litigation efforts of 
the U.S. computer hardware industry beat out those of the computer 
software industry to make sure that every software patent was subject 
to plenary discretionary review, thereby rendering it practically 
worthless. This absence of meaningful patent protection from the 
U.S. computer software industry lasted throughout the 1970s and 
‘80s, and was infamously associated with the dominance of that 
industry by a single large player, Microsoft.30  
The interest of large companies in using their considerable 
litigation and lobbying budgets to direct government discretion 
towards efforts to block the patents of their smaller competitors is 
further exemplified by the many troubles facing Rambus in the 
DRAM market. Rambus, a relatively small research firm, has been 
frustrated by many of the world’s largest DRAM manufacturers who 
have argued that the Rambus patents cover technologies that are too 
basic and, as upstream patents, are blocking downstream 
development. The fundamental problem with this rhetorical 
dichotomy between upstream and downstream is that it is false and 
narcissistic. Terms like upstream and downstream are so relative that 
they amount to synonyms for things to be bought and things to be 
sold by a party, who will want everything the party needs to buy to be 
 
OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).  
 30. Patent protection for computer software was effectively eviscerated through the 
Supreme Court’s Benson decision. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For a discussion 
of the lead-up to Benson and its impact, see In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 772–74 (C.C.P.A. 
1974) (Rich, J., dissenting) (noting normative problems with such a rule against software 
patents but pointing out the appellate court’s duty to follow the Supreme Court case law on the 
issue). The Benson approach remained in effect throughout the 1970s, until finally, perhaps due 
in part to a shift in its makeup, the Court changed views in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 
(1981) (holding there to be no per se exclusion for software patents). Nevertheless, it was not 
until In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) and perhaps even State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), that the market fully 
responded to the availability of patent protection for software. 
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free and everything the party wants to sell to be protected with 
property rights. This is neither a principled nor an effective basis 
upon which to design the U.S. patent system. Notably, even though 
the Federal Trade Commission found against Rambus, the 
Commission itself had trouble identifying the exact wrong it found 
Rambus to have committed, holding the company liable under the 
Commission’s broadest general authority—noting that the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit already had determined that the 
company had not committed the fraud and breach of contract on 
which Rambus’ larger competitors had based their complaint.31 This 
lack of support explains why the Commission’s decision was set 
aside by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.32  The particular irony is not only that courts and agencies 
have agreed that Rambus did not commit the particular bad acts 
relating to standard setting that had been originally alleged; but also 
that the complaining DRAM manufacturers, Hynix and Infineon, 
have recently settled with the U.S. government in one of the largest 
criminal antitrust price fixing cases ever, involving fines now totaling 
over half a billion dollars and jail sentences for several of the 
conspiring executives.33  
2. Patents and Competition  
A second example from IP of the risks associated with adopting 
features of property rights “at their worst” is the way patents are 
 
 31. In re Rambus, Inc., 2007 WL 431522 (F.T.C., Feb. 2, 2007) (final order).  
 32. Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 2008 WL 1795594 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2008).  
 33. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice Press Release, Samsung Agrees to Plead Guilty and to 
Pay $300 Million Criminal Fine for Role in Price Fixing Conspiracy, available on-line at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05_at_540.html:  
Samsung Electronics Company Ltd. (Samsung), a Korean manufacturer of dynamic 
random access memory (DRAM) and its U.S. subsidiary, Samsung Semiconductor 
Inc., have agreed to plead guilty and to pay a $300 million fine for participating in an 
international conspiracy to fix prices in the DRAM market, the Department of Justice 
announced. Samsung’s fine is the second largest criminal antitrust fine in U.S. history 
and the largest criminal fine since 1999. . . . Including today’s charge, three companies 
and five individuals have been charged and fines totaling more that $646 million have 
resulted from the Department’s ongoing antitrust investigation into price fixing in the 
DRAM industry. 
Id. 
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alleged to give rise to antitrust concerns. In fact, the concerns raised 
at the patent-antitrust interface often get backwards the nature of the 
competitive impact of property rights.  
Admittedly, every property right creates some form of market 
power. But an antitrust analysis is more complicated than simply 
uttering “market power” or “monopoly.” The purpose of antitrust 
laws is to protect against a large player dominating a market through 
unreasonable restraints on competition to cause higher prices, less 
output, or lower quality goods and services. But a company’s 
dominant market share alone is not anticompetitive. Sound theory 
and practice teaches regulators to instead focus on whether the 
company’s behavior causes actual economic harm to consumers. This 
requires regulators to consider tough questions of technology and 
economics. In this regard, several points must be kept in mind when 
considering the interface between patents and antitrust.  
First, it is important to recognize that the antitrust laws are 
designed to focus on power over a market, not over a particular good 
or service sold in a market in competition with other goods or 
services. A patented technology faces competition from yesterday’s 
technologies, other technologies available today to address similar 
consumer demand, and the threat imposed by those technologies 
coming tomorrow. Indeed, the greater a patentee’s market power at 
any given time, the greater the incentive spurring others to invent 
alternative non-infringing substitutes for the patented technology.  
Even if a patent conferred market power, it is now widely 
accepted that the antitrust laws are designed to remedy only one 
feature of a monopoly, the resulting inefficiency, but not the impact 
market power might have on the fairness of how wealth is allocated 
between producers and consumers. More particularly, the antitrust 
laws are designed to avoid the deadweight loss that can be caused by 
monopolies. The economic inefficiency associated with the 
deadweight loss is shown by the triangle C+E in Figure 4.  
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FIGURE 4 
Pc = Competitive Price
Qc = Competitive Quantity
Dc = Competitive Demand
MRc = Competitive Marginal Revenue
Pm = Monopoly Price
Qm = Monopoly Quantity
A+B+C = Consumer Surplus in Competitive Market
D+E = Producer Surplus in Competitive Market
B+C = Lost Consumer Surplus Because of Monopoly
B = Consumer Surplus recovered as producer surplus
E = Lost Producer Surplus
C+E = Deadweight Loss
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The deadweight loss triangle shown in Figure 4, however, need 
not arise with every monopoly. While perfect price discrimination is 
of course impossible, the magnitude of the deadweight loss decreases 
to the extent the monopolist can engage in some form of price 
discrimination. The complex contracting that most IP owners would 
like to engage in precisely because it makes them more money is also 
the type of contracting that facilitates price discrimination. For 
example, a patentee might structure her sales arrangements of 
expensive machinery so that customers pay only per use—metered 
perhaps by some inexpensive input like a sheet of paper—rather than 
for the entire cost of the machine. Whatever the approach to price 
discrimination, it will depend heavily on courts enforcing the actual 
terms of the complex contractual arrangements that will have to be 
entered into by the patentee with those making, providing, and using 
the patented technologies.34  
While some might think that price discrimination is hard to 
conduct and can create dissatisfaction among consumers who suffer 
the realization that they are not paying the same price as others for 
the same good or service, the routine practice of the passenger airline 
industry shows that these problems are not insurmountable. Today, a 
passenger on a flight will frequently have paid a different price for 
her seat than the person sitting next to her, yet the airline is able to 
 
 34. For more on how price discrimination can be used by patentees and how dependent 
this is on predictable contracts and property rights, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and 
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727–32 (2001).  
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charge those passengers different prices based on their willingness to 
pay (some having paid lower prices for booking earlier, for example), 
and the passengers are able to travel next to each other without 
causing social unrest.  
Not only are patents not the serious threat to competition that 
many assert, but, contrary to popular belief, the weakening of patent 
protection actually can facilitate the concentration of market power. 
As discussed above, coordination can be “good” in that it leads to 
increased commercialization by bringing complementary users of an 
IP asset together. But there is a “bad” type of coordination as well — 
“bad” because it decreases competition and access to goods and 
services by better enabling coordination among large, established 
businesses to keep out competitors. What is paradoxical about many 
of the reforms urged by patent critics is that the statutory changes 
would end up facilitating this “bad” type of coordination.  
Consider what might be called a keiretsu strategy for dealing with 
patents. The term keiretsu refers to the large conglomerates in Japan, 
where the patent system is well known to be replete with a great deal 
of essentially weak patents and devoid of strong ones. The 
transaction costs of litigation and conflict that are likely to ensue in a 
system populated by large numbers of low value patents can be of 
real help to the keiretsu because they make it easier to have large 
numbers of skirmish battles while avoiding the threat of death blows.  
While large numbers of skirmish battles do have high transaction 
costs, those costs are worth it to those doing battle because they buy a 
great deal of benefit. These battles help the keiretsu in two important 
ways to communicate with each other when trying to engage in 
anticompetitive coordination efforts.  
First, the repeated skirmishes over low value patents allow the 
battling keiretsu to communicate with each other in a way that may 
be more forthright than a direct conversation (i.e., they help solve an 
information sharing and related trust problem). Seeing where an 
opponent will spend resources to fight can communicate more than a 
direct conversation about what territory is most coveted. In addition, 
the extensive exchanges of documents and sworn deposition 
testimony that are so infamous in the U.S. litigation system 
communicate vast quantities of detailed information.  
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Second, these lawsuits allow the battling keiretsu to communicate 
with each other in a way that may be more protected from antitrust 
review than a direct conversation (i.e., they help solve an antitrust 
problem). The taking of one territory while yielding up another 
through a set of court battles and related settlements will more easily 
escape antitrust scrutiny—and will also more easily mitigate the 
damages awarded if any antitrust action were brought and won—than 
would a direct conversation to divide these territories.  
Third, having large numbers of patents can be a simple tool for 
extracting a higher price after regulatory interventions, because in the 
big antitrust actions brought against large patentees, such as the well-
known IBM patent litigation in the United States, the amount the 
regulators allow the companies to charge is often based in part on the 
simple total of the number of patents in its portfolio. Moreover, large 
players should be less afraid to engage in anticompetitive conduct in 
the first place if they are ensured that business can still be profitable 
even if they are caught by the antitrust regulators.  
This keiretsu strategy is particularly beneficial to large players in 
that it helps ensure that only weak patents are available to all players, 
large and small. This matters, because strong patents could end up in 
the hands of a small “David” and enable it to better take on the 
“Goliaths.”  
At bottom, the availability of predictable patent rights, judged to 
be valid or invalid based on objective facts, that can be enforced 
robustly whether used by large or small players is exactly what 
promotes both the commercialization of new ideas and competition in 
the market. Unfortunately, many of the reforms being discussed 
today shift the nature of patents to take on the attributes of property 
rights “at their worst,” decreasing the likely beneficial impact of 
these IP assets.  
3. Patents and Developing Economies 
To further illustrate the importance of property rights in IP, we 
turn to an illustration from the developing world and consider the 
recent calls by the United Nations World Health Organization 
(WHO) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to 
abrogate patents on crucial medicines like anti-malarials and anti-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/10
p 215 Haber Kieff Paredes book pages.doc 7/29/2008 10:33:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Property Rights in Finance and Innovation 241 
 
 
retrovirals in the name of protecting world health and fostering 
economic development. In fact, IP is essential for facilitating the 
complex business deals needed to deliver drugs in the first place. 
Further, the real problems in the developing world are not drug 
patents. Over 95% of drugs on the WHO’s essential medicines list are 
off-patent. When patented drugs are given to those countries for free, 
as they often are, the drugs are heavily taxed or outright taken by 
corrupt local governments—sometimes even resold on black markets 
to the United States, Japan, Europe, and elsewhere. All this while 
millions of people in the developing world are dying from war, 
famine, unsanitary conditions, and lack of basic health care.  
Nobody is suggesting that merely adding a good patent system 
will immediately cause those in a less developed country to churn out 
the next blockbuster pharmaceutical of the type we all know takes 
teams of PhDs and hundreds of millions of dollars to generate. That 
said, strong IP rights will help protect the many creative assets in 
these regions. Brain power is the one natural resource that is 
uniformly distributed across the peoples of the world. It takes 
academic snobbery to think innovation cannot be valuable unless it 
happens at a G8 university. Many forms of valuable IP are 
particularly likely to be found in the less developed economies of 
Africa. Necessity can be the mother of invention, and regions where 
improvements in basic irrigation and agriculture techniques are to 
help the most, may be those where this innovation is likely to occur. 
What is more, valuable IP need not be technological. Indeed, much of 
the commercially successful music and fashion in the West 
incorporates substantial African influences. The notion that Western 
countries like the United States could actually be paying smaller 
countries for the use of their valuable IP is not a creature of fantasy. 
By way of example, consider the recent deal struck by the Starbucks 
coffee company to license Ethiopian coffee trademarks.35  
This may help explain why those behind attacks on drug patents 
are countries that have extensive manufacturing facilities which 
would require payments to holders of biotechnology patents, while 
African countries like Botswana and Malawi are working tirelessly to 
 
 35. See Janet Adamy, Starbucks, Ethiopia Agree on Licensing, WALL ST. J., June 21, 
2007, at B6.  
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help strengthen the rule of law by enforcing property rights in 
intangibles, including contracts and IP. Initiatives along these lines 
offer hope, and the countries of the G8 should continue to spend 
financial and political capital to bolster such efforts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Prevailing voices from the political economy literature are clear. 
George Stigler explains how concentrated benefits and diffuse costs 
allow a small politically-active group of interested individuals to get 
through the democratic process the rules of the game they want.36 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock show that interest groups who 
figure this out will quickly compete for these benefits.37 Fred 
McChesney, Hernando de Soto, and Andrei Shleifer and colleagues 
show that in response, government actors will also compete to attract 
political attention by doling out favors and other benefits.38 
Government actors will compete against each other to erect “toll 
booths” in front of the public so government officials can extract 
payment from interest groups wanting favorable passage. Milton 
Friedman similarly showed how even seemingly benign and 
unrelated government agencies acting in good faith can effectively be 
drawn into such competition through mission-creep, erecting 
additional toll booths and ultimately extracting additional rents.39  
As a result, when thinking about how to structure a system of 
economic regulation, we should always try to determine how both 
market actors and government actors will react in the face of various 
possible legal regimes. We should also expect to be unable to select 
the true outcome in a given case with certainty, and so we should try 
to develop a set of comparative analyses that account for the 
inevitable overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness associated with 
different regulatory approaches. We also should develop an 
 
 36. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGM’T. SCI. 3 (1971).  
 37. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962). 
 38. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory 
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1990); 
Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 3 (2002).  
 39. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, WHY GOVERNMENT IS THE PROBLEM 9 (1993).  
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understanding of who is the lowest-cost provider and evaluator of the 
information needed to make an appropriate decision, and be vigilant 
about containing the transaction costs of different decision-making 
processes. Perhaps most importantly, we should be skeptical of the 
comparative exposure to public choice pressures of different 
regulatory approaches. 
The observations in this Essay indicate particular circumstances 
where we think such an analysis weighs in favor of property-rights 
treatment “at its best.” That said, we recognize that each set of 
circumstances must be analyzed rigorously and that the right 
approach will, at least in part, depend on the relevant facts on the 
ground.
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